governance but wait passively to respond to an "agenda set by others" (Schachter, 1997, p. 65) .
The idea that the public sector should conduct its affairs in a businesslike way is not new in the United States. Though there are enduring classical republican elements in American political thought that emphasize citizens working together for the good of the community, the American public sector exists within a context of market capitalism and classical liberalism. The values of this context include limited and efficient government in combination with individual liberty and political competition. Relatively little attention is given to problems associated with the workings of the market, such as economic inequality or reduced opportunities for collective citizen decision making through discourse.
A strong governmental apparatus can operate to set the parameters of market activity and its impact on the lives of citizens, but in the United States big government must exert control without seeming to be like a centralized Europeanstyle state. Although they wanted a stronger government than that provided by the Articles of Confederation, the founders of the United States intended to avoid forming a state apparatus with a purpose and values of its own and a mandate to shape the broader society. This initial "statelessness" (Stillman, 1991) is manifest in contemporary public administration debates over the issue of legitimacy (Public Administration Review, 1993) . The concept of statelessness can be overdrawn, as Americans built an extensive government to meet the challenges of the years 1877-1920, including "the emergence of a nationally based market" and "the growth of trusts and oligopolies with national orientations and national economic power" (Skowronek, 1982, p. 11) . Because of this institutionbuilding effort, contemporary American government has a significant interactive relationship with the private economy, but it retains from the founding era the cultural expectation of minimal interference in the private sector. This expectation forms a political-cultural context in which the values of the private sector are primary and the values of collective citizen deliberation and the public interest are secondary. Even in this setting, there historically has been recognition of a unique and different role for the public sector, however difficult to define. This was true in the founding era, in the era of Jacksonian democracy, in the reform era, and through several decades of the post-World War II era.
Today, even those elusive public-private differences are fading as the public sector is increasingly penetrated by the metaphor of the market, of "running government like a business." The expansion of such thinking in the public sector has important implications for theory and practice. This article examines the nature of the political culture that encourages market-based practices in the American public sector, explores the issues of the size and scope of government and the role of the public service practitioner, and offers a framework for the study and practice of public administration in this economistic environment that is based on citizenship and public service. The article is not about the specifics of any particular reform effort, and the intent is not to bemoan the condition of the public sector. Rather, the article suggests constructive ways that publicservice practitioners and academicians can approach these issues in their work, seeking to preserve and enhance the essence of public service within the market context.
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSE TO MARKET PRESSURES
Expansion of market concepts in the public sector is taking place at the end of the 20th century thrust to build administrative systems that address the problems of a growing urban-industrial nation. That thrust produced a public sector that appears today to be large, cumbersome, wasteful, and beyond citizen control (King & Stivers, 1998b, p. 11) , isolated from and out of touch with the rest of society (Peters & Pierre, 1998, pp. 228-229) . Large government requires that a few elected people represent the wishes of the masses, and representative democracy has grown so remote from the everyday lives of people that it no longer bears a clear relationship to common experience (Hummel & Stivers, 1998) . Many citizens are so alienated from the concept of self-governance that they think of government as something separate, not a reflection of their own will, though some others would like to participate directly in re-creating the machinery of government to allow for genuine self-governance. As a potential remedy, many politicians and citizens believe that government should be run more like businesses, becoming trim and lean, exhibiting competitive behaviors, and giving greater attention to the needs of "customers."
Evidence of the expansion of market concepts in the public sector may be found in the literature and practice of public administration in an emphasis on a constellation of cost-cutting and production management concepts taken from the private sector, currently drawn together as new public management. These concepts include, among others, privatization, downsizing, rightsizing, entrepreneurism, reinvention, enterprise operations, quality management, and customer service. New public management seeks to separate politics (in the sense of decision making by the people or their representatives) from administration, allowing (or making) managers to manage according to cost-benefit economic rationality, largely free from "day-to-day democratic oversight" (Cohn, 1997) . Such a separation resembles the old politics-administration dichotomy and Herbert Simon's (1945 Simon's ( /1997 ) description of administrative decisions that are largely "factual." In this reformed management setting, the public-private distinction is "essentially obsolete," and management is generic across sectors (Peters & Pierre, 1998, p. 229) .
This desire to separate the activities of politics (deciding about public policies) and administration (implementing them) is part of a redefinition of the function of government based on "a new elite consensus on the role of the state in society. A substantial public sector is to be maintained, but its purposes and operating values are considerably different from that which was characteristic of the social welfare state. The goal is no longer to protect society from the market's demands but to protect the market from society's demands" (Cohn, 1997, p. 586) . This is both an American and international phenomenon (Cheung, 1997; Cohn, 1997; Hood, 1996; Kettl, 1997; Lan & Rosenbloom, 1992) , and it may be seen as evidence of a new equilibrium in relations between economic classes. We may no longer find useful the "stale discourse of class warfare" (Barber, 1998, p. 8) , but expansion of economistic concepts in the public sector could reflect the reality that "big government has always been an ally of the little guy, and downsizing it has generally been a recipe for upgrading the power of private-sector monopolies. Schoolroom bullies are forever questioning the legitimacy of hallway monitors" (Barber, 1998, p. 5) .
At the level of governmental operation, the question is the extent to which the functions of government should be modeled after the private sector. This gets to the heart of the matter for public-service practitioners, who want to know what is expected from public agencies, how they should relate to citizens (their customers, to use the language of the market), and what is the proper source of policy direction-professional interpretation of the public interest, decisions by elected officials, or the desires of citizens. For over a century, public administration practitioners and academicians have debated the normative role of practitioners, with opinions ranging from neutral implementers of policies determined by others to practitioners as active participants in the policy-making process (Kass & Catron, 1990; McSwite, 1997) . Despite the intent of new public management, market concepts are not likely to remove the practitioner from policy making because government is so complex that citizens and elected representatives cannot govern alone.
Instead, running government like a business means that public managers increasingly regard the public as customers to be served rather than as citizens who govern themselves through collective discourse processes. They keep the public at a distance by conducting surveys and focus groups to identify existing opinions rather than engaging citizens face-to-face in exchanges of information, ideas, and values that result in informed governance. As elected officials withdraw from direct and frequent involvement in administration, the balance of control shifts toward professionals (Cope, 1997) . With citizens excluded from collective governance and elected officials withdrawn from the daily world of policy implementation, the question becomes, "Who then is accountable?" (Peters & Pierre, 1998, p. 228) .
An important task before public administration theorists is to describe the impact of governing and managing by market theory and practice on public service at all levels of government and to explore how theorists and practitioners can respond. Is a complete transformation of the public sector, mimicking the private sector, the answer in the face of pervasive public preference for use of market-like management practices and the apparent reduction of many processes and interactions to cost-benefit calculations? Is this really a problem, or are we approaching the old ideal of pure businesslike efficiency by walling off "unrelated" matters of politics and preferences from public management, squeezing out of professional practice substantive consideration of whether what we do efficiently, instrumentally, is the right thing to do?
Furthermore, in this market-like environment, is it possible to identify aspects of public service that are in some way fundamental to our notions of a good political culture, aspects that can coexist with market concepts of structure and function? At some point, theorists, and more so practitioners, may find it makes sense to worry less about the apparently unstoppable expansion of the market in the public sector and search for constructive ways to respond to it. For practitioners, one way to do this is to simply comply, mastering the expected economic techniques and carrying out policies as given without taking part in their formulation or questioning them. This response fits well with the traditional split between politics and administration, emulating the model of the neutral bureaucrat. For the academician, this approach means confining research to technical matters of management, such as pay-for-performance plans, budgeting systems, or information technology, thus avoiding critical analysis of the effects of market concepts on the public sphere.
A second way to respond to the expansion of market concepts in the public sector would be to protest vigorously in hopes that someone, someday, will listen, or at least that if the pendulum swings in the other direction in the future, we will be well positioned to say "we told you so." This could be a risky strategy for practitioners in the work world and it could position academicians as useful critics of current practice or place them so far outside the mainstream as to be ignored. A third path in responding to the current situation would be to hope for moderation of the impacts of market concepts in the future, but for today, to seek reasonable ways to adapt public service values to the dominant economic paradigm. This is the path outlined in the final section of the article.
THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT
We can gain a broader perspective by considering the nature of the society that surrounds public administration, the society that creates, supports, and demands services from the public/governmental sector. A description of the nature of society may seem somewhat removed from daily administrative affairs, but of necessity public administration is a reflection of societal values. It is impractical, maybe irresponsible, to operate inside public organizations as if the demands of society do not matter. If we do, sooner or later the external environment will catch up to us, making painful demands for accountability and change that might have been foreseen and dealt with in less traumatic ways.
We have known for some time that the modern market economy would have serious impacts on society and in particular on democracy. In 1906, Max Weber asserted that it is utterly ridiculous to see any connection between the high capitalism of today-as it is now being imported into Russia and as it exists in America-with democracy or freedom in any sense of these words. . . . The question is: how are freedom and democracy in the long run at all possible under the domination of highly developed capitalism? (in Gerth & Mills, 1958, p. 71) In 1931, John Dewey expressed concern for the future of democratic governance:
The dominant issue is whether the people of the United States are to control our government, federal, state, and municipal, and to use it in behalf of the peace and welfare of society or whether control is to go on passing into the hands of small powerful economic groups who use all the machinery of administration and legislation to serve their own ends. (in Campbell, 1996, pp. 178-179) Ramos (1981/1984) took for granted the "intrusion of the market system upon human existence," with its accompanying emphasis on instrumental rationality that advances the goals of the market, rather than substantive rationality that offers the individual an opportunity to achieve "truly self-gratifying interpersonal relationships" through reason, the activity of the human psyche (p. 23). Scott and Hart (1979) documented the transition from a society based on the value of the individual in the preindustrial era to one of organizational values in the 20th century. Now, in an age in which we are replaceable parts of large systems, we think with nostalgic fondness of a time when each person was an integral part of a local community. We spend part of our leisure time watching movies or television shows that glorify the heroic loner, but most of us in real life fulfill our destiny as small productive parts of larger systems.
In the United States, the nation's founders created a governmental structure that allowed limited popular participation in national political life while emphasizing order and stability. In so doing, they established a semidemocratic form in which "the 'people' was no longer being defined, like the Athenian demos, as an active citizen community but as a disaggregated collection of private individuals whose public aspect was represented by a distant central state" (Wood, 1996, p. 219) . The focus was on individual rights and protection from the power of government, as contrasted with the classical republican ideal of citizen selfgovernance.
With the rise of capitalism in the 19th century, it became possible to combine democracy and capitalism by clearly separating the economic and political spheres. Thus, citizens maintained their formal public-sector liberal equality in relation to rights, voting, and the law, whereas private-sector inequalities of wealth and power generated by capitalism were largely off-limits to collective, public action. These were the conditions of creation of modern liberal democracy (Adams, Bowerman, Dolbeare, & Stivers, 1990; Wood, 1996, p. 234) , a "Lockean accommodation" that "reconciled representative government with capitalism by disenfranchising the group most likely to contest the hegemony of wealth-the working class itself" (Bowles & Gintis, 1986, p. 42) . It is semidemocratic in that the mass of people participate in a limited and marginal way in collective decision making. In the balance between the public and economic spheres, the public sector is allowed to trim off the rough edges of economic excess in relation to treatment of workers, consumers, and the physical environment, in exchange for keeping public-sector interference with the inequalities of the economic sector to a minimum. Thus, as the market has "insinuated itself into the domains of sentiment, life-style and psyche," it has "bound the state with subtle threads of economic dependency" (Bowles & Gintis, 1986, p. 34 ).
There do not at present seem to be any viable alternatives to this semidemocratic capitalist model (Dryzek, 1996) . On a global level, there were competing models for much of the 20th century, but now those models have largely vanished. There are a few socialist enclaves remaining, and a number of relatively undeveloped countries with authoritarian regimes, now being pressured by the public and private institutions of developed nations to change their economic systems to conform with the semidemocratic capitalist model. Over time, it may be discovered that this model is not optimal for all nations, that it works best for mature, stable societies with institutions that can support it. It may not work well for a range of nations with cultural and political histories very different from those of developed Western societies, nations in which the semidemocratic capitalist model can lead to hardship and social unrest (Kaplan, 1997) .
Today, even the possibility of alternative systems seems to be disappearing, and the market metaphor is dominant. We are apparently in the midst of postmodern conditions characterized by thick interpretations of reality at the micro, local level where people can interact directly and form coherent mutual interpretations of values and identity, and thin reality at the macro level of broad classes of people, regions, and nations. This results in a profusion of difference, an "assertion of the random nonpattern and the unassimilable anomaly" (Fox & Miller, 1995, p. 45 ) that shifts and changes constantly. In such an environment, postmodernists believe it is difficult if not impossible to identify grand themes of common belief or interest across large groups of people or geographic areas.
In the midst of this apparent fragmentation of meaning, the daily mechanics and values of the market permeate social, political, and economic life. Families are pressed by economic circumstances to alter their expectations about work, retirement, child rearing, and care of the elderly. Workers are forced to abandon the certainties of lifetime employment, instead constantly keeping an eye on the job market and the best opportunities to increase earning power. Private, public, and nonprofit organizations must constantly adapt to their rapidly changing environments. In the public sphere, it becomes harder and harder to generate large-scale communities of shared interest through direct discourse and personal action, even at a time when people yearn for a return to a sense of community and personal efficacy (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985; Box, 1998; Eberly, 1994) . So, we live in postmodern times characterized by large-scale fragmentation of values and intensification of interest in local action, yet we are surrounded by the seemingly universal, global phenomenon of market mechanisms. Within this universal phenomenon, there appears to be general agreement that people are competitive self-maximizers out to lobby legislatures for their benefit at the expense of others, get the largest quantity of consumer goods their resources will command, climb over the backs of colleagues for career advancement, compete at the community level to draw the best companies to their town at the expense of other towns, and so on. Furthermore, this view seems to reflect not only a description of what we are but also a normative vision of what we should be, in a "celebration of wealth that now threatens to drown all competing values" (Lasch, 1996, p. 22) . Times change, and if this competitive, consumerist life pattern affects the world's physical environment and social stratification in ways that clearly threaten individuals, the pendulum of public opinion and political action may shift, as it did during parts of the 1960s and 1970s. But for now, "more is more" instead of "less is more," and the market is our guide.
In such circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the language and methods of the market have made significant inroads into public-sector thought and practice over the past two decades. However, American public administration has not been a pure entity removed from the influence of the market during any period in its development. At all levels of government throughout the nation's history, there has been evidence of market-like behavior, such as 19th-century spoils politics that affected policy implementation at the national level and the local-level graft and machine politics that inspired urban reformers to take action. The progressive-era reaction to these perceived abuses was to separate politics and administration at least to the extent that administration would be more businesslike and scientific. Ironically, this meant that reformers wanted to use the management methods of the market to reduce the extent of market-like behavior in the public sector.
In the 20th century, with the rise of the administrative state, public professionals became more prominent in the formulation as well as implementation of public policy. As the overall scope of government expanded dramatically, the internal management of government retained an expectation of efficiency in the midst of a sense of broader public purpose. There were repeated examinations of management of the national government that advocated application of scientific, businesslike methods to improve efficiency (Arnold, 1995) . At the local level, the council-manager plan was built on a corporate structural model with the expectation that it would produce efficiency and effectiveness.
Beginning in the 1950s, some economists turned their attention to the public sector, applying their assumptions about individual and collective behavior to the public sphere. By focusing on the individual as the unit of analysis, assuming that individuals seek to maximize their personal preferences in the "political market" as they do in the private sector, and treating the behavior of citizens, elected officials, political appointees, and public professionals as examples of self-seeking regard for their own interests, the public choice scholars discovered a public world very different from that of public administration scholars (Johnson, 1991) . Where traditional theorists found people searching for a better society and the public interest, economic theorists found the public sector operating like an alternative form of market. In this view, traditional bureaucratic, hierarchical government is not a means to social betterment, but a mechanism that distorts private economic behavior, reduces individual freedom, and makes the economy less efficient. The way to reduce these negative effects, according to economists, is to decentralize government, make it smaller, and introduce market-like concepts such as fees and user charges, vouchers, and systems to monitor employee performance, such as merit pay plans (Jennings, 1991, pp. 115-116; Ostrom, 1973 .
At the conceptual level of the size and scope of government, the economic view is that, when it will be to their benefit, individuals, groups, politicians, and bureaucrats seek to maximize their gains in the public market by competing with others for the benefits offered by collective action (Downs, 1957; Niskanen, 1971; Olson, 1965) . Corporations seek to make it harder for potential competitors to enter the market, associations seek tax breaks others cannot have, politicians fight for the power and money of office, and public-sector bureaucrats want their agencies to grow so that their status and freedom to act are increased. Governmental action coerces individuals in society into behaving in a manner consistent with majority will, whether or not they agree with it, and those who stand to benefit the most from governmental action will spend the time and resources to influence public policy decisions. A basic assumption of economics is that free and uncoerced individual choice should be maximized and that, where a clear need for collective action in the public interest is lacking, citizens should be allowed to act alone or in voluntary cooperation without governmental coercion (Schmidtz, 1991, chap. 7) . But government grows larger and more powerful as people use it to gain advantage over one another. This rent-seeking behavior joins the economic inefficiency of government-as-monopolyprovider-of-services as an argument for smaller and more limited government.
At the conceptual level of public agencies and employees, economic rationality has had a significant impact on scholarly thinking about behavior in organizations. Niskanen's argument that public bureaucrats will seek to increase the size of their agency's budgets (1971; or as modified in 1991, the size of the discretionary budget) was an effort to reconceptualize the behavior of public employees, moving away from models of control by legislatures or a sense of duty to the public interest, to a model of the public professional as a selfinterested maximizer of competitive position in the bureaucratic world. Niskanen's ultimate purpose was to shift attention from the attributes of bureaucrats to the characteristics of public agencies, especially the structural features that provide incentives for people to behave in certain ways (Niskanen, 1991, p. 28) .
In the past few decades, economically oriented examination of public organizations has been a growth industry, adopting a variety of complex and interesting approaches. Summarizing this work in 1984 in an article on "The New Economics of Organization," Moe noted that it is "perhaps best characterized by three elements: a contractual perspective on organizational relationships, a focus on hierarchical control, and formal analysis via principal-agent models" (p. 739). Among approaches to organizations that fall within the new economics rubric, principal-agent theory is especially applicable in the public sector, where the relationships between citizens (principals) and politicians (their agents) and between politicians (principals in this case) and bureaucrats (their agents) are a constant source of fascination. Agency theory deals with questions that arise because "the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict and it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing" (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 58) . It is assumed that agents will naturally do less work than principals want done or fail to do work in the way principals want it done. This is the problem of shirking, and principals meet it by seeking information on the activities of agents; this monitoring is time-consuming and costly. Thus, it behooves the principal (e.g., boss, superior, capitalist, or politician) to seek a wage rate that will motivate agents (employees, subordinates) and a level of monitoring that is not too costly but convinces agents that the risk of being caught shirking is substantial (Bowles & Gintis, 1986, pp. 77-78) .
There are important implications of this line of thought for behavior in public organizations. The economics-based management tools being applied in the public sector are grounded in the economist's assumptions that employees will shirk and that monitoring is essential (though the assumption of economically rational behavior has been under attack for some time; see Anderson & Crawford, 1998 ). The focus is on explicitly specifying performance, through mechanisms such as clearly articulated contracts and/or pay-for-performance systems. In New Zealand, for example, many public agencies have been changed so that "top managers are hired by contract, rewarded according to their performance, and can be sacked if their work does not measure up" (Kettl, 1997, p. 448) . Although this is more extreme than typical implementation of principal-agent concepts in the United States, such thinking can be found in the emphasis on various techniques to measure and reward performance and outcomes, as well as movement away from rigid civil-service systems. Although the elegantly simple structure of principal-agent theory is becoming more cumbersome and problematic with the accumulation of empirical data on its application (Waterman & Meier, 1998) , it remains a powerful tool in the hands of contemporary governmental reformers.
It was in the 1980s, amid the antigovernment ideology of the Reagan administration and a wave of public sentiment for shrinking the public sector, that market-like concepts broke through the weak wall of separation between the values of the market and the values of public management. Trickle-down, supplyside economics and public choice economics pointed the way to prosperity through smaller government, and it was thought that bureaucratic waste could be eliminated through contracting out and becoming entrepreneurial, and soon the entire public sector would, supposedly, be as efficient as the private sector was assumed to be. The negative aspects of treating public purposes as if they were private became apparent through events such as the savings-and-loan crisis at the national level and reevaluation of the tenets of "reinvention" at the local level (Gurwitt, 1994) , but the transformational impact of this period cannot be denied. This is reflected in the writing of a deputy project director for the Clinton administration's new-public-management-inspired National Performance Review. Although noting that "there is no single intellectual source for the reinventing government movement," he says that it "evolved during the past 10 to 15 years . . . based, in part, on the pioneering intellectual work of public choice theoreticians such as Mancur Olson, E.S. Savas, Gordon Tullock, and William Niskanen" (Kamensky, 1996, pp. 248) .
THE SIZE AND SCOPE OF GOVERNMENT
As Weintraub (1997) has pointed out, there are several meanings of the distinction between public and private, including the following: the liberaleconomistic model, based on neoclassical economics, which regards the publicprivate distinction the same as that between state administration and the market economy; the civic perspective, which views the public realm as separate from both the market and the administrative state; and other perspectives, including feminism, that examine distinctions between public and private as involving the spheres of sociability and family and household (pp. 16-17) . Here, we take a viewpoint looking outward from inside the administrative state to examine penetration of the market metaphor into public administration, so we are concerned with the liberal-economistic model that is "dominant in most 'public policy' analysis" (p. 16).
Given the development of the political environment described above, it is not surprising that Americans have always been searching for an acceptable balance between what is private and what is public. In the early to mid-19th century, there were debates over the national government's role in banking and funding internal improvements such as telegraph transmission and canals for water transportation. For the most part, the trend was toward resisting expansion of the national role amid prevailing public opinion hostile to action by the national government (White, 1954, pp. 437-481) . Efforts to expand the role of government were more successful in the late 19th century and into the 20th century, as the regulatory and welfare state was built in response to the changing character of national economic life. Then, beginning with the Reagan administration in the 1980s, the growth of the national government was again brought into question. At the local level, the scope of governmental activity grew steadily, accelerating after World War II as the population expanded and suburbia was built.
Along with questioning the size and scope of government in the 1980s, there was a revival of interest in localism and limited government. If it seems to the individual that the national or state government is too distant, too big, and so dominated by entrenched interest groups that he or she cannot have much effect on public policy, it is natural to turn attention toward a locus of action small enough to offer the possibility of quick and satisfying results. As president, Ronald Reagan encouraged this sentiment as he sought to dismantle the welfare state and return its functions to states, localities, and private and nonprofit sector organizations. The communitarian movement emphasized nongovernmental action and citizen duties as well as rights. These ideas were given additional thrust by the withdrawal of the national government from many domestic initiatives and the phenomenon of tight resources at all levels of government.
In the midst of the 1980s milieu of negativity toward government, with its bureaucrat bashing and belief that government is the problem rather than the solution, economic thinking about the role of government in society blossomed and became part of the ordinary vocabulary of normative debate. By the 1990s, the idea that government needed to be smaller and more efficient had become accepted as common wisdom (though the reality was different at the state and local levels, as government continued to expand; see Walters, 1998) . Of those people who spend time thinking about the size and scope of government and its role in society, many have come to hold the view that government at all levels is too big and it would be wise to spin off functions from the national government to the states and localities, or from government to the private and nonprofit sectors.
The economist's conceptual scheme for determining what is public and what is private has become standard fare for students of public affairs and underlies much of the public discourse about the role of government (Mikesell, 1995, pp. 1-6) . Thus, we distinguish between public goods, such as national defense, and private goods, such as household appliances or a hamburger. Public goods would not ordinarily be offered by the private sector acting on the incentive of making a profit because people cannot be excluded from using it and so have no incentive to pay for it (the market failure to provide a good). If it is provided at all, it is available to everyone, and one person's use of a public good does not exhaust its usefulness to others (because I experience the benefits of being defended from foreign aggression does not mean that you cannot experience them, too). Because people could experience the benefits of public goods without paying for them (the free rider problem), government coercively forces members of the public to pay taxes or face financial penalties or imprisonment.
In the real world, things are not so simple, so there are modifications and exceptions to the concept of pure public goods and pure private goods. Toll goods are services that many people use but from which people may be excluded (such as swimming pools open for public use or expressways that charge fees), and common-pool resources are goods that can be exhausted as many people use them but for which exclusion is difficult (notably natural resources such as fisheries). The distinctions between types of goods are often fuzzy, and publicsector decision makers use criteria of public demand and political action to choose which services to offer rather than ideal conceptualizations of types of goods. Thus, government becomes involved in providing a variety of services that might appear to belong in the private or nonprofit sector. In addition, government regulates the activities of private actors as they work with toll, common-pool, or private goods, attempting to control negative effects (externalities) of private economic activity on people or the environment.
To add to the complexity, a distinction is made between the provision of public services and their production. Provision is the fundamental question of whether or not government will cause a service, or good, to be offered. It is a policy question to be decided by the people or their representatives. If the answer is negative ("No, we don't want to provide garbage pickup service"), then either private or nonprofit organizations will provide the service or no one will. If, using the example of garbage pickup, no one provides the service (a market failure), there will likely be a discussion of the public health implications and a revisiting of the negative provision decision. Production is a separate issue. If the provision decision is positive, then the question remains how to actually deliver the service, how to produce it. Osborne and Gaebler argued in their book Reinventing Government (1993) that government often does a better job of governance, or steering (making policy decisions) than of delivering services, or rowing (see chap. 1). Osborne and Gaebler included in the steering-rowing distinction governmental decision making about contracting out services and a governmental role in serving as catalyst for private and nonprofit initiatives such as downtown renewal or building sports facilities.
In an appendix to their book, Osborne and Gaebler built on the work of Savas (1987) to offer decision-making criteria for choosing public, private, or nonprofit action, such as stability, regulation, and enforcement of equity (publicsector strong points), expertise and willingness to take risks (private-sector attributes), and compassion and promotion of community (nonprofit-sector attributes). Vincent Ostrom (1973 has written extensively about institutional structures, intergovernmental arrangements, and building institutional capacity that helps people to govern themselves. Using a combination of public choice theory and a historical analysis of American government, Ostrom emphasizes the benefits of a multifaceted, polycentric system of governmental organizations and their private and nonprofit partners, organized to fit the services they offer so that the result is the best possible blend of efficiency with responsiveness to the public (e.g., community police patrol may be more efficiently and effectively organized on a small local scale, whereas police communication systems, detention facilities, and crime laboratories may be handled better through large-scale organization [1977, pp. 1518-1520] ). These ideas appear to be helpful, although the circumstances surrounding specific decisions are often complex and uncertain, making application of decision-making criteria difficult.
In the end, it appears that determinations about which goods are provided by the public sector are made according to the rule, "whatever people want and will pay for," and production arrangements are a matter of trial and error according to political preferences. At the national level, our attitudes about the scope and size of government change periodically as we face new challenges and social and economic conditions. In response to evidence of widespread poverty, hunger, and injustice, we mount a campaign to redistribute incomes, taxing the middle class and wealthy to help the poor. In good economic times, politicians find ways to give tax breaks and programmatic "goodies" to the middle class to secure their votes in the next election.
At the local level, the choices made about which services to offer vary significantly from community to community. Some places confine themselves to providing the basics of public safety, streets, and sewer and water. Others provide a wide variety of services, for example, public pools, bicycle trails, recreation programs, public hospitals, downtown redevelopment programs, public-private partnerships to encourage economic development, and so on. In a community in which the author of this article lived for 8 years, the city utilities department discussed offering repair of home appliances to residential customers to make the city more competitive when private-sector firms enter the deregulating market for electric service. As one might imagine, people in the appliance repair business were not pleased with this potential entrepreneurial endeavor, viewing it as public expansion into an area thought of by most as a private-sector activity.
The complexities of intergovernmental relations, deciding whether services should be offered by small local units of government, larger ones, or regional agencies, which services will be provided by government and which will be produced by government or by the nonprofit or private sectors, and so on, are matters often resolved incrementally. To some extent the theory of public goods may influence such decisions, but likely it serves in large part to describe and critique what has taken place after the fact. For some time, there has been disagreement in the public administration community about the size and scope of government and the application of market thinking, with its elements of maximum individual choice, decentralization, and privatization. These issues are unlikely to be resolved anytime soon, if ever (see, e.g., Golembiewski, 1997; Kettl, 1997; Lyons & Lowery, 1989; Phares, 1989; Ross & Levine, 1996, chap. 11; Stillman, 1991, pp. 176-185; Waldo, 1981, p. 97) .
MARKET VALUES AND THE NATURE OF PUBLIC SERVICE
Given the importation of private-sector management techniques into the public sector in the past two decades, many public administrators are expected to be entrepreneurial, offer great customer service, and practice the latest management techniques inside the agency (total quality management, pay for performance, and so on). On the surface, it appears that such techniques would make the public service much more efficient, with results that would please citizens (they get better service), elected officials (they get credit for public agency efficiency), and career public-service practitioners (they get more approval and respect from citizens and elected people). And indeed, anecdotal evidence as well as scholarly research indicates that market-based reforms have produced some desired changes in the way government operates in the United States, as well as significant changes in several other nations (Kettl, 1997) .
There are, however, potential problems with making the public service more businesslike because there is a difference in the operating norms of private-and public-sector organizations. Terry (1993) described entrepreneurial values as including "autonomy, a personal vision of the future, secrecy, and risk-taking" (p. 393), along with "domination and coercion, a preference for revolutionary change (regardless of the circumstances), and a disrespect for tradition" (p. 394). According to Terry, these values are at odds with values of "democratic politics and administration," such as "accountability, citizen participation, open policymaking processes, and 'stewardship' behavior" (p. 393). In a response to Terry, Bellone and Goerl (1993) espoused "civic-regarding entrepreneurship," which offers a community-minded model of administration that is accountable to the public. Terry, however, is not sure entrepreneurship can easily be combined with public service. His overriding concern is that "public entrepreneurs of the neomanagerialist persuasion are oblivious to other values highly prized in the U.S. constitutional democracy. Values such as fairness, justice, representation, or participation are not on the radar screen" (Terry, 1998, p. 198) .
The contemporary emphasis on entrepreneurship makes this debate appear new. However, it is to some extent a repackaging of the old politicsadministration question that has been in play since the late 19th century and was highlighted by the Friedrich-Finer argument in the early 1940s over the role of the administrator as relatively independent, expert actor, or tightly constrained agent of political officials (for a description of this argument, see McSwite, 1997, pp. 29-52) . The repackaging is occasioned by renewed pressure to manage like a business as economic concepts permeate the thinking of policy makers and implementers. Although administrators are pushed to use entrepreneurial and scientific techniques to please the "customer's" assumed desire for businesslike government, they paradoxically become less accountable to the public, whose members lose some control over administration. For example, administrators may use expenditure-control budgets, which allow flexibility to spend as the professional sees fit, and to save money to carry over for discretionary spending later to avoid direct budgetary control by politicians. The assumptions are that this flexibility will make for more nimble response to changing conditions, give managers an incentive to be frugal, and remove political motivations from what ought to be expert decisions. Using Bellone and Goerl's reasoning, the good public administrator will, in exercising this greater degree of discretionary space, take into account the wishes of citizens in making choices. This logic reopens the question of representative democracy and agency; that is, do public administrators answer to the public, or to their elected representatives (Box, 1998; Fox & Miller, 1995; Kelly, 1998) ?
The argument against such flexibility in budgeting is that clear and detailed line-item budgets were created to avoid problems of financial abuse and to ensure that money is spent as citizens or their elected representatives decide it should be spent. Saving up money means that it has not been spent as intended by representatives but instead will be spent as nonelected administrators decide-thus, a question of accountability. Supposedly scientific techniques administered by experts, such as cost-benefit analysis, reengineering, and quality control, may lead to more precise and economically efficient service delivery, but they may also crowd out competing citizen preferences for public policy and service delivery, preferences that can be shown by experts to be inefficient or impractical. This sort of result is often seen in disputes over such relatively minor issues as whether to preserve a historic building or remove esthetically pleasing landscaped medians in major streets to make traffic flow smoothly.
In these and similar instances, there is a conflict between the idea of public management as efficient, businesslike, and scientific, and public management as responsive to these and to other public values as well. Jennings (1991) offered three approaches to public administration that capture the essence of this conflict. The bureaucratic approach "takes efficiency and equal treatment of citizens as its primary values," the pluralism approach "emphasizes responsiveness to multiple interests," and the market approach "takes efficiency as its prime value," differing from the bureaucratic approach in emphasizing diversity of product and maximum consumer choice (p. 122). It may be argued that public administration theorists have in the past tended to prefer one of the first two approaches. Those who favor greater status and discretion for public administrators lean toward the bureaucratic approach, and those who favor greater citizen discourse and self-governance lean toward the pluralist approach. But today, most agree that some measure of market-like matching of public services to consumer preferences, along with efficient and technically competent management, is inevitable if not desirable. The question is how much, in what ways, and whether there are aspects of public service that should not be governed or managed from a market perspective.
The problem in seeking a reasonable balance between approaches in the face of demands to run government like a business is that operating with privatesector entrepreneurial techniques in the public sphere can subvert values of openness, fairness, and public propriety. In such cases, the public-service practitioner may take on the appearance of an independent actor separated from the public, concerned less about the public interest (however defined) and more about making money and maximizing individual power and freedom to act without review. This decreased accountability carries the possibility of unexpected program outcomes, uneven treatment of citizens, and behaviors that have not generally been thought of as consistent with public service. Again, using the example of city utilities in a community in which the author lived, this time in relation to the question of openness, the utilities department attempted to deny public access to many of its documents on the premise that it must operate secretly to level the playing field with its private-sector counterparts. In relation to fairness and a sense of public propriety, the local publicly owned hospital in the same community is semiautonomous, competes aggressively and successfully for market share with the other hospital in town, advertises its high-tech services widely, makes a sizable surplus, and pays its top executive approximately $300,000 per year, including bonuses based on how much the hospital makes. To some people these may not seem like appropriate behaviors for the public sector.
Movement toward a market model thus may result in loss of citizen selfdetermination in the creation of public policy and the operation of public organizations. Today, most people recognize that a general return to the participatory democracy of an earlier time and simpler society is impossible. However, in this post-progressive era, many are working to rebuild citizen capacity for selfgovernance through discourse and active citizenship (Barber, 1984; Box, 1998; Eberly, 1994; King & Stivers, 1998a) . Not everyone will take part in such efforts, but, as Fox and Miller (1995) put it, having "some-talk" is better than having "few-talk" (pp. 129-159) . The goal is to move beyond the typical model of citizen participation that is "not designed primarily for citizens but for agencies" (Timney, 1998, p. 98) , in which administrators use citizen involvement processes for "informing, consultation, and placation" (Timney, 1998, p. 97) rather than enabling people to govern themselves.
Market-driven new managerialism can run counter to self-governance, as it is structured around the idea of happy consumers rather than involved citizens. This is a problem because government is not a business from which customers can voluntarily decide whether to purchase a product. It is, rather, a collective effort that includes every person within a defined geographic area (city, county, district, state, nation), and membership is involuntary unless a resident moves out of the jurisdiction. Mandatory membership carries with it a sense of the right to be involved if one so wishes in the process of deliberating and deciding on creation and implementation of public policy. As Barrett and Greene (1998) wrote, "Governments that buy too heavily into the idea that customers are a higher form of life than citizens risk losing the participation of taxpayers as partners" (p. 62).
Customers, on the other hand, are people to be persuaded and sold an image, a product, or a service rather than people who deliberate and decide. Schachter (1997, pp. 57-58) pointed out that only some public agencies can have customers in the manner of private-sector organizations. Many public agencies cannot easily identify their customers because the public they deal with is divided into a variety of individuals and groups with conflicting goals. Many others are regulatory or stewardship agencies for which the immediate client may not be the true beneficiary of the service. An example of the former would be a school district, for which the customers could be students, parents, or all adults in the community. Examples of the latter could include a restaurant regulated by the local health department (Is the department's customer the restaurant owner or the people who eat at the restaurant?), or the forest service (Is the customer the wood products industry or current and future generations who would use the forests?). These examples illustrate the fundamental difference between the market and the citizenship models of governance. The model of management formed around the market metaphor may lead to channeling resources into creating an image through public relations, surveying citizen opinion, and responding to perceived individual service preferences, rather than bringing citizens together to make their own decisions. This requires keeping the public at arm's length while operating in an entrepreneurial manner behind a facade that gives the appearance of involving citizens and making decisions in the general public interest.
CONCLUSIONS: PRACTICING PUBLIC SERVICE IN THE MARKET ENVIRONMENT
Few would argue that government should be inefficient on purpose or inattentive to the needs and desires of its clients. In this sense, reinvention, privatization, entrepreneurism, customer service, and other such techniques are good things, bringing a breath of fresh air, challenge, and constructive change to the public sector. But market-like techniques may become problematic when they overwhelm values traditionally associated with the public sector and with public service. The economic assumptions of individual self-maximization, the public interest as the aggregate of private interests, and the public sector as just another form of market are powerful, focused, elegantly simple tools of analysis. Like other powerful and narrow theoretical constructs, they draw appropriate attention to matters of importance, but they also insist on their way of knowing the world while excluding other valuable theoretical orientations.
James March (1992) argued that in the past few decades economic theorists have softened the pure application of their ideas to the public sector, moving from methodological individualism to recognition of the fabric of institutional and structural relationships that make up a community. They now take into account, along with their original assumptions, "a rich, behavioral interpretation attentive to limited rationality, conflict, ambiguity, history, institutions, and multiple equilibria" (p. 228). He also noted that this softer, more subtle application of economic concepts has not yet penetrated into the world of applied theory because "the news of the transformation of rational theory spreads rather slowly from the inner temples of microeconomics to the rationalizing missionaries in the rest of an economizing society and social science" (p. 229). As this news spreads, the current reforms will fade and reformers will move on to new ideas, but like earlier reforms, they are likely to leave a legacy. The legacy of economistic theory in the public sector may include greater attention to "performancemotivated administration" and the integration of economic concepts into the traditional intellectual matrix of public service (Lynn, 1998, p. 232) .
Turning toward application of these ideas to the size and scope of government, the historical American attitude toward the public sector has been that it should not compete with the private sector but should provide services that the private sector will not. However, with time, the clarity of the public-private distinction has faded as people ask government to do more and citizens grow accustomed to things as they are. In the past two decades, this combination of a preference for limited governmental scope with incremental accumulation of services in violation of that preference has been complicated by expansion of economicsbased theory and practice. The public-choice side of the running government like a business metaphor suggests shrinking government by contracting out services or returning them to the private sector on the premise that the private sector is more efficient (in the case of contracting) or the assertion that the public sector should simply be smaller (in the case of true privatization). Meanwhile, the entrepreneurial side of the metaphor suggests that government may retain its traditional services and operate them like a business, plus operating services ordinarily thought of as private in order to make money. One way government officials are able to accommodate these diverse demands without making government smaller is to make it appear to be morphing into a publicly owned business by charging user fees, contracting parts of its services, or adopting the language and practice of the private sector by, for example, calling certain services companies or businesses and using a variety of private-sector internal management techniques.
In the area of application of market concepts to the conduct of public service, the potential impacts are significant. The prevailing American attitude about the nature of public service has been to expect market-like efficiency and businesslike operation but in combination with public service values such as accountability, fair and equal treatment, democratic self-governance, social justice, protection of the physical environment, and others. Schachter (1997) pointed out that progressive-era reformers, although striving for a more efficient government, also advocated informing citizens so they could be more active in governing. Today's expansion of economic thinking and the potential separation of expert service provider (public service professional) from customer (citizen) may be one of the most serious threats to public service values Americans have experienced.
This leaves contemporary academicians and practitioners with the task of defining preferred normative balances of public and private and of market-like management and public service. We can identify four broad areas in which economic thinking prompts reexamination of substantive assumptions about the public-private relationship and public service. As we do so, we recognize that these assumptions about public institutions are unique understandings that incorporate our history, institutional development, interpersonal interactions, and the surrounding political, social, and economic environment. They are unique because they vary and change by place, time, and human action; their "structural properties" exist as "practices and memory traces orienting the conduct of knowledgeable human agents" (Giddens, 1984, p. 17) rather than as fixed and fully understood phenomena. Taken together, the narrative of these four areas outlines a framework for discourse about the nature of the American public sector and public service. This framework cannot provide clear normative answers to the challenge of the economistic environment, but it can point toward ways of preserving a public-regarding essence of citizenship and public service while responding constructively to the contemporary economic-political environment.
Services the public sector should provide. In every community, region, state, and at the national level, there are at a given time services that a majority of citizens believe should be provided by the public. This belief may not be based on extensive knowledge and could change if people were to have more information (this is the problem of improving the quality of public judgment; see Yankelovich, 1991) , but it is possible to identify attitudes about what services should be public. There are likely a range of reasons that people would give for wanting to have certain services provided by the public sector rather than by the private sector or not at all, but there may be a primary characteristic of public services that most Americans would agree forms a sound decision rule for determining what is public and what is private.
We may hypothesize that, asked to consider a particular service that they think should be publicly provided, people would generally agree that they want certainty that the public has the ability to maintain or change the service in keeping with what the majority thinks to be in the public interest (however defined; in this case, it can be assumed to be the long-term interests of the greatest number, when the public is provided adequate information to make a determination). The standard example of national defense is one on which strong majority agreement can be found and other examples would draw varying responses according to place, time, and the sampled population.
The decision rule of ability to maintain or change a service in accord with a majority view of the public interest is different from the market-driven service rule that uses individual preferences as the basis for governmental response. It focuses not only on efficiency or businesslike operation but also on citizen beliefs about the public interest, the good community, whatever it is that citizens think is best for themselves and others, acting collectively. How to inform and involve citizens in making such decisions may be unclear, but it is clear that this is a decision milieu driven by different values than those of the market. It is also a process that includes collective public deliberation and assistance from publicservice professionals.
Services the public sector should produce. Within the category of services that people believe should be provided by the public, there are services involving discretion and accountability such that the public is uncomfortable with an arm's length contractual relationship and the possibility of the profit motive rather than public interest determining outcomes. Examples could include police patrol and crime investigation, protective services for children, land-use regulation, and some human resources functions.
These services can be contrasted with a range of things that do not involve the same level of discretion and accountability and are good candidates to be contracted out or fully privatized for reasons of cost efficiency, purchase of specialized expertise that would cost too much to maintain on staff, or greater flexibility in staffing levels. Examples could include operating a police impoundment facility for seized vehicles, conducting psychological evaluations of defendants awaiting trial, and constructing valid test instruments for jobs that draw large numbers of applicants.
Democratic governance. There are processes of governance that most Americans expect will be maintained as purely public, rather than being contracted, privatized, or operated by public employees in a closed, unilateral, market-like manner. Though people like good customer service when they need to pay their water bill or have a street repaired, they want to know that they have the option, whether exercised or not, to take part in determining policy and assessing implementation. This goes beyond Osborne and Gaebler's idea of steering rather than rowing, as the issue is not just what government does (steering, or making decisions, versus rowing, or carrying them out) but who has the right and ability to make policy and implementation decisions. This is at the heart of citizenship and self-governance.
Thus, although most would agree that government should use efficient business methods in technical, operational areas, this does not mean that business principles of efficiency, scientific management, or closed and centralized decision making should dominate the creation or evaluation of public policy, or exclude citizens from self-governance. To accept a broader view of governance is to assert that government is not ultimately guided by a market model of competition and efficiency but by a citizenship model of governance. This broader view places businesslike management techniques in an instrumental position subordinate to the larger sphere of governance. It draws citizens, elected officials, and public service professionals together in the joint project of creating and implementing public policy.
The role of the practitioner. It might be assumed, in the manner of the old politics-administration dichotomy or the current policy-management split of the market metaphor, that public-service practitioners should not play an active part in shaping issues, debates, and decisions on the questions of what is public or private or whether public policy and services should be approached using the market or the citizenship models. However, there is little doubt today that practitioners are an important part of policy formulation and implementation, providing information needed by citizens and elected officials to frame policy decisions and generating proposals that often form the basis for public action.
Thus, practitioners fill multiple roles in addition to the traditional bureaucratic role, serving as expert advisers and as facilitators of citizen discourse. The open question is how this is to be done in a society that expects nonelected public servants to maintain a position clearly subordinate to elected officials and citizens. This question involves issues of legitimacy and leadership. Is it possible to be an important actor in the creation and implementation of public policy without straying outside the legislative mandate or becoming dominating, selfserving, and causing restriction of public access and freedom to act?
Public practitioners are, because of proximity and knowledge, deeply involved in the broad issue of the extent to which the market metaphor should guide public governance. They exercise influence in discussions about what services should be public, how they should be operated, and whether the public practitioner serves customers or citizens. Though there will always be concern about the legitimacy of this role, many practitioners are in a position to shape the public sector by offering their knowledge to peers, citizens, and elected representatives trying to meet the challenge of governing in an economics-driven political culture. In doing so, they can serve the interests of public service and democratic will formation by keeping in mind the shifting and dynamic nature of the relationship of the market to the public sector and the importance of their actions in shaping the future.
